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For the love of football? Using economic models of volunteering 
to study the motives of German football referees 
Emrich, E., Pierdzioch, C., Rullang, C. 
Abstract 
Using data for a large sample of German football referees, we studied the motives for 
becoming a football referee. Based on a long modeling tradition in the literature on the 
economics of volunteering, we studied altruistic motives (public-goods model) versus 
non-altruistic (egoistic private-consumption motives and human-capital motives). We 
differentiated between self-attributed and other-attributed motives. We found that 
altruistic motives on average are less strong than other motives. Other-attributed 
altruistic motives are stronger than self-attributed altruistic motives, indicating the 
presence of a self-interest bias. We further found that referees who report strong 
altruistic motives have a higher willingness to quit refereeing when other referees would 
referee more matches, consistent with the public-goods model. In line with the human-
capital model, altruistic motives are stronger for senior referees. Altruistic motives are 
also stronger for those referees who view refereeing as a volunteer activity. 
Keywords: Football referees, motives, socioeconomics of volunteering, survey data, 
volunteerism 
 
1. Introduction 
Football is the most popular sport in Germany. The German Football Association 
(Deutscher Fußballbund) organizes official matches in three professional leagues, 
several regional leagues, and in numerous amateur leagues. Thousands of football 
matches take place on match days. Many tens of thousands of spectators watch the 
matches in the stadiums and on television, making football a large-scale industry. This 
industry could hardly prosper without a sufficiently large number of individuals who are 
willing to act on match days as a football referee. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
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much research has been done to study various facets of football refereeing like a 
potential home team favoritism of football referees (Boyko et al. 2007, Dawson et al. 
2007, Buraimo et al. 2010), the influence of social pressure on football referees' 
decisions (Garciano et al. 2005, Dohmen 2008, Dawson 2012), and the psychological 
and physiological strains and stress under which football referees act (Teipel et al. 2001, 
Mascarenhas et al. 2009). Recent research has focused on facets including the social 
role of referees (Emrich and Papathanassiou 2003), prevalence of violence against 
football referees (Rullang et al. 2015a), the economic background of referees (Rullang 
et. al. 2015b report results for female referees), personality traits that football referees 
think are important for managing a game (Brand and Neß 2004), the meaning of 
different forms of authority (Rullang et al. 2015c), and match fixing (Emrich et al. 
2015).  
Our study focuses on the motives why individuals have become referees and, thereby, 
contributes to the growing literature that studies the motives why individuals become 
football referees. In this literature, Johansen (2015) reports, based on a sample of 44 
Norwegian football referees, that passion-based motives are more prevalent among elite 
referees, while fitness-based motives are more prevalent among non-elite referees and 
social-based motives are equally important across the two groups of referees. Auger et 
al. (2010) report results based on a questionnaire survey of 469 officials of 16 Canadian 
sports federations. They find that the main motivation for being an official is the love 
and passion of sport, followed by the motive to participate in leisure-time activities, and 
by the motive to develop on a personal level (Figure 1, page 41). As for motivates for 
continuing as an official the findings indicate that a leading motive is to be satisfied, 
useful and integrated, followed by the motive to improve and surpass personally (Figure 
2, page 42). Hancock et al. (2015), using data for 514 officials from 18 Canadian sports 
federations, report that officials begin officiating for intrinsic and for the sports reasons, 
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and that intrinsic and social motives help to explain why officials continue officiating. 
For two samples (80 and 227 participants) of French football referees, Phillippe et al. 
(2009) find that referees report that they are passionate about refereeing, and Friman et 
al. (2004), based on interviews with seven Swedish football referees, report that having 
fun to be a football referee is a main motive for refereeing. 
In our research, we make use of the fact that the German Football Association asks 
football clubs to add a club-specific number of referees to an overall pool of referees 
which the association then uses to organize matches. Especially in lower-class leagues 
football refereeing, therefore, can be seen as a volunteer activity, where football referees 
make a contribution that football associations and football clubs can use more or less 
free of charge. Even more, refereeing football matches can be interpreted as the 
production of a public good because upon refereeing matches football referees make a 
fundamental contribution to run the entire league system. Because all football 
associations and all football clubs benefit from the league system non-excludability and 
non-rivalry in consumption are characteristic features of football refereeing. 
Drawing on the analogy between volunteering, the production of a public good, and 
football refereeing, we organize our study of the motives of football referees using 
results reported in the large and significant literature on the economics of volunteering. 
In this literature, three broad classes of models of volunteering have emerged: the 
public-goods model (Roberts 1984, Bergstrom et al. 1986, Duncan 1999), the private-
consumption model (Andreoni 1989, 1990, Harbough 1998), and the human-capital 
model (Menchink and Weisbrod 1987). The public-goods model stipulates that 
individuals contribute to and derive utility from the total provision of a public good, 
where individuals have altruistic preferences insofar as they derive utility when the 
utility of others due to the consumption of the public good increases. Because 
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individuals are only interested in the total provision of a public good, there should be a 
close substitutability between the voluntary services of individuals. In the private-
consumption model, there is no such substitutability because individuals are assumed to 
have non-altruistic (egoistic) preferences. It is the act of volunteering from which they 
derive utility because volunteering, for example triggers a ”warm-glow'' feeling and 
helps to spend leisure time in a worthwhile manner and to meet other people. The 
human-capital model, in turn, implies that individuals benefit from volunteering 
because it helps them to accumulate job-market skills and social capital (see Coleman 
1988). Because the accumulation of social capital is easier in larger groups of 
individuals the voluntary services of different individuals are complements rather than 
substitutes (Ziemek 2006, Emrich and Pierdzioch 2015a). 
Upon studying the motives why individuals have become football referees we could test 
empirically the public-goods model against its two competitors. For our empirical tests, 
we used a novel large micro dataset of German football referees. We used this large 
micro dataset to construct indexes of referee altruism that aggregate various motives for 
becoming a football referee. We found a substantial heterogeneity of the indexes across 
referees. According to our indexes, non-altruistic (private-consumption and human-
capital) motives tend to be more important than altruistic motives for many football 
referees. In line with the human-capital model of volunteering, we found that senior 
football referees articulate stronger altruistic motives than younger referees. We also 
found that those referees who report strong altruistic motives have a higher willingness 
to quit refereeing when other referees would referee more matches, which is consistent 
with the kind of substitutability of referee services predicted by the public-goods model.  
Our results were qualitatively unchanged when we controlled for a potential bias due to 
“motive talk”, a well-known phenomenon in research on volunteering (Smith 1981, 
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Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001, to name just a few; see also Musick and Wilson 2008, 
pages 69-70, and the references cited therein). Motive talk may give rise to a social-
desirability bias, but it may also reflect a self-interest bias. A social-desirability bias 
(see, for example, Flatau et al. 2015, and the references cited therein) arises if a football 
referee reports that he or she mainly was motivated by altruistic motives because 
altruism is socially highly valued. We accounted for a social-desirability bias by asking 
football referees about their views on why other individuals have become a football 
referees. Our empirical findings do not show any evidence of a social-desirability bias. 
On the contrary, we find that self-attributed altruistic motives are on average weaker 
than other-attributed altruistic motives. This finding is consistent with a self-interest 
bias documented in research in social psychology (see Holmes et al. 2002, and the 
references cited therein). A self-interest bias arises if individuals do not want to appear 
as being overly altruistic because being a do-gooding-referee may pave the way for 
additional commitments and could threaten self-assertion.  
We organize the remainder of this research as follows. In Section 2, we describe our 
data. In Section 3, we report our empirical results. In Section 4, we summarize our 
results and offer some concluding remarks. 
2. The Instrument and the Data 
The data were collected from July 12 to August 27, 2013 by means of an online 
questionnaire study that was part of a research project conducted by the authors for the 
German Football Association. A top-down approach was chosen to send referees the 
link to the online questionnaire study. In total 4,813 football referees (of which were 
216 female referees) participated in the study. 
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In order to cover the spectrum of motives underlying the three classes of economic 
models of volunteering, a total of ten items were used to measure motives for becoming 
a football referee. The specification of the ten items was based on data collected by 
means of interviews with 12 football referees that had been conducted before the study 
was started. In the online questionnaire, referees could answer every item based on a 5-
point Likert scale from “do not agree at all” to “totally agree”. Table 1 summarizes the 
ten items and shows how the items were allocated across the classes of economic 
models of volunteering. Data on the ten items were collected for both self-attributed 
motives and the corresponding other-attributed motives (“When you think about other 
referees, why do you think did they become a football referee?”, see Emrich et al 2013). 
Table 1 also shows the assignment of motives across economic models of volunteering, 
where the public-goods model represents altruistic motives and the other two economic 
models represent non-altruistic motives. 
-- Please include Table 1 about here. -- 
The potential substitutability between one’s own referee services and others’ referee 
services was measured by means of a public-goods-model question “What would you 
do in case your football club could manage to supply the number of referees required by 
the football association without your help?”, where the referees could choose between 
the answer “I would quit refereeing” and “I would continue refereeing”. If a football 
referee answers that he or she would quit refereeing then such an answer is direct 
evidence of a substitution effect as an increased effort of other individuals is perceived 
to lead to a crowding-out of own effort. We found that only 155 football referees 
answered that they would quit refereeing in case other individuals would be willing “to 
do the job”. This finding is a first informal hint that the type of altruism postulated by 
the public-goods model is not the dominating motive for becoming a football referee, 
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but also that the population of football referees studied in this research is not entirely 
homogeneous in this respect. 
The population of football referees is also heterogeneous in another important respect. 
Because the economics of volunteering provide the theoretical foundation of our 
empirical research, we also asked football referees whether they interpret their 
refereeing as a volunteer activity. A total of 3,663 (76.12%) football referees answered 
“yes”. Hence, there is some heterogeneity as to whether refereeing is interpreted as a 
volunteer activity. One would expect that the indexes of referee altruism differ across 
those football referees who interpret their refereeing as a voluntary activity and those 
how do not see themselves as volunteers. Table 8 summarizes the results. Those football 
referees who see themselves as a volunteer have on average a higher score with regard 
to the index of referee altruism, and this effect is significant. 
-- Please include Table 2 about here. -- 
In addition, we collected several sociodemographic and sports-specific data. We asked 
for age (N=4,636, mean=36.69, SD=16.23), gender (4,399 males, only 216 female 
referees participated in the study), and experience as a referee (how many years a 
referee has refereed football matches, N=4,699, mean=13.95, SD=11.80). In order to 
capture potential path dependencies in a referee’s career, we asked whether a referee 
was or has been an active football player (never=386, some time ago=3,195, currently 
active players=1,101) and whether he or she already had interrupted before his or her 
career as a referee (binary, yes=1,369, no=3,444).  
As a proxy of opportunity costs of refereeing we asked how many hours per week a 
referee spends on training for his or her refereeing activities (N=4,547 mean=3.07, 
SD=2.95) and how many matches a referee referees per year (N=4,442, mean=42.34, 
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SD=24.08). Another measure of opportunity costs is income, which was measured using 
six broad classes to avoid a non-response bias (<1000€, [1000€; 2,250€), [2,250€; 
3,500€), [3,500€; 4,500€), [4,500€; 5,500€), >=5,500€; observations: 849, 1246, 1061, 
524, 217, 217). 
As a measure of referee satisfaction, we asked (5-point Likert scale) referees whether 
they think that the experiences they have made during their career as a football referee 
are in line with their expectations at the time when they became a football referee 
(N=4,298, mean=4.09, SD=0.86). As a measure of professionalism, we asked the 
football referees to provide data on the league level at which they refereed matches at 
the time when the online questionnaire study was conducted (Table 3). 
-- Please include Tables 3 and 4 about here. -- 
Finally, the decision to continue or quit refereeing may depend upon a referee’s 
experiences with offences, threats, and even violence (Rullang et al. 2015a). Referees 
could rate their personal experiences with offences, threats, and violence on a 5-point 
Likert scale. Table 4 summarizes descriptive statistics of the data. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Indexes of Referee Altruism 
Equipped with data on the ten items for self-attributed and other-attributed motives, we 
summed up over model-class-specific items and divided by the number of items 
available for a model class. We also divided by a factor of five (because every item was 
measured using a five-point Likert scale) such that every sum could assume a maximum 
of unity. Thus, upon letting Ci, i ={PGM, PCM/HCM}, denote a model class, we 
formed 
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Ci =
1
5n
I i, j
j=1
n
∑ , (1) 
where Ii,j denotes item j in model class i, and n denotes the number of items for the 
model class under consideration. We then formed an index of referee altruism defined 
in terms of the ratio 
C jPGM
CPCM /HGM
j
, (2) 
where j={s,o}, for both self-attributed, s, and other-attributed, o, motives. If the ratio in 
Equation (2) assumes a value larger than unity then altruistic motives (public-goods 
model) dominate the other motives (private-consumption model and human-capital 
model). We computed the ratio defined in Equation (2) separately for self-attributed and 
other-attributed motives. 
We further formed an adjusted index of self-attributed motives as the ratio 
C jPGM
j=s,o
∑
CPCM /HCM
j
j=s,o
∑
 (3) 
to capture a potential social-desirability / self-interest bias. If, for example, a social-
desirability bias is at work then other-attributed private-consumption and human-capital 
motives should outweigh other-attributed public-goods motives, resulting in a 
downward adjustment of the ratio given in Equation (3) relative to the ratio of self-
attributed motives given in Equation (2). In contrast, if a self-interest bias is present in 
the data then the ratio given in Equation (3) should exceed the ratio of self-attributed 
motives given in Equation (2) 
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Figure 1 shows histograms of the index of self-attributed motives (N=3,821), the index 
of other-attributed motives (N=3,713), and the adjusted index of self-attributed motives 
(N=3,442). The histograms show that the extent of altruism substantially varies across 
referees, where altruistic motives dominate only for a minority of referees. For most 
football referees, the indexes assume values smaller than unity, indicating a dominance 
of private-consumption and human-capital motives. 
-- Please include Figure 1 about here. -- 
We ran a principal-components analysis (PCA), estimated on the ten standardized 
(mean zero, unit variance) motive items, to check whether the data support the 
allocation of motives items across economic models of volunteering outlined in Table 1. 
The results of the PCA showed that the two first principal components explained a total 
of 47% of the self-attributed motives (with results being similar for other-attributed 
motives). The correlation between the score vector implied by the first principal 
component and the PGM nominator of the index of self-attributed motives turned out to 
be 0.90. The correlation with the second score vector was only 0.30. Similarly, the 
correlation of the PCM/HCM denominator with the first score vector was -0.44, and 
0.88 with the second score vector. The results of the PCA, thus, showed that the 
nominator and the denominator of the index of self-attributed motives represent 
different dimensions along which the data vary, lending support to our assignment of 
the motive items to the economic models of volunteering. 
The mean value of the index of self-attributed motives is 0.78 (SD=0.48). The mean 
value of the index of other-attributed motives is 0.92 (SD=0.29). The difference in 
means between the self-attributed and other-attributed motives is significant (t-test = -
16.11, p-value < 0.01, two-sided test), where the adjusted index of self-attributed 
motives has a mean of 0.82 (SD=0.28). Other-attributed altruistic motives, thus, are 
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stronger (relative to the other motives) than self-attributed altruistic motives. This result 
is inconsistent with a social-desirability bias, but rather indicates the presence of a self-
interest bias in the data. 
The reason for why such a self-interest bias is present in the data can best be understood 
by noting that football clubs in Germany are asked by the German Football Association 
to add a club-specific number of referees to an overall pool of referees for the different 
leagues. Contributing refereeing services to this pool is of crucial importance because 
otherwise, if there are not enough referees in this pool, league games cannot take place. 
Hence, it is not surprising that, in case clubs are unable to contribute the requested 
number of referees to the pool, they must pay a penalty fee to the association. As a 
result, a referee who feels a strong loyalty to his or her club can refuse refereeing only 
at high social costs. In case of recurrent rejections of the implicit obligation to act as a 
referee, such an unwilling would-be referee even runs the risk of being suspended from 
the community of football. This creates a dilemma for a would-be referee because, 
given the public-goods nature of the pool of referees created by the association, it is not 
unusual that a referee has to refuse recurrent requests to extent a voluntary engagement 
as a referee for reasons of self-assertion and increasing opportunity costs. As a result, 
even if a referee is an altruist who feels a strong loyalty to his or her football club, it is 
advisable for a referee not to present himself or herself as an altruistic do-gooder referee 
to prevent overly frequent requests to referee league games. On the contrary, if a referee 
presents himself or herself as not too altruistic, the officials of a football club cannot 
take it for granted the a referee spends ever more time on a voluntary referee activity. In 
such a situation, the officials of a football club, in an attempt to avoid penalty fees, will 
intensify their efforts to enlarge the pool of club members who are able and willing to 
act as a referee.  
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4.2 Economic Correlates of Referee Altruism 
Given the substantial heterogeneity of the indexes of referee altruism across referees, it 
is interesting to inspect the economic correlates of referee altruism. To this end, we used 
least-squares regression models. Because a gender effect has been documented in the 
literature on charitable giving (Emrich and Pierdzioch 2015b, and the references cited 
therein), we included gender in the list of regressors. Other researchers have reported 
that altruism may increase in income (Andreoni 2001, Hoffman 2011), so we included 
income in our regression model. Drawing on human-capital models (Glaeser et al. 
2002), and earlier empirical evidence (Emrich and Pierdzioch 2014), we accounted for a 
possibly nonlinear dependence of referee altruism on age. 
-- Please include Table 5 and Figure 2 about here. -- 
Table 5 summarizes the results (for indexes in natural logs). Results are similar for the 
index of self-attributed motives and the adjusted index of self-attributed motives, where 
the gender effect is only significant for the former index. The gender coefficient is 
positive for both models, implying that the index of referee altruism is on average 
somewhat larger for females than for males. Higher income classes have significant 
negative coefficients, indicating that the indexes of referee altruism are smaller than in 
the baseline case when income increases. Figure 2 shows the indexes of referee altruism 
by income groups. In contrast to the results given in Table 5, the indexes increase in 
income, in line with results reported in different contexts in recent research (Hoffman 
2011). However, those referees who have a high income also tend to be senior referees 
and, as the regression results demonstrate, after controlling for age the sign of the 
correlation between income and the indexes of referee altruism turns negative. 
-- Please include Figure 3 about here. -- 
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Age has a significant effect on both indexes of referee altruism. Figure 3 illustrates the 
nonlinear positive association between the indexes of referee altruism and age, where 
the number of observations becomes small for referees who are older than about 65 
years. The positive association between the indexes of referee altruism and referee age 
is in line with predictions made by human-capital models of volunteering (for an 
analysis of altruistic motives of elderly persons in a sport-specific context, see Emrich 
and Pierdzioch 2014). Similarly, models of human-capital formation predict that 
individuals invest in their stock of human (job-market skills) and social (building social 
networks) capital mainly in their younger years because for young individuals the 
returns on such investments are higher than for the elderly. 
-- Please include Figure 4 about here. -- 
The degree of professionalism should increase in higher leagues and, as a result, one 
would expect that the indexes of referee altruism get smaller in higher leagues. In fact, 
Figure 4 shows that the indexes of referee altruism tend to exhibit a negative correlation 
with the league level. While the indexes decrease as expected on average in higher 
leagues, this effect is small in quantitative terms. Moreover, the interpretation of this 
result should not be pushed too far because the number of observations for the high-
league levels is small. Moreover, when interpreting the results depicted in Figure 4, it 
should be kept in mind that the league level is likely to be endogenous with respect to 
the indexes of referee altruism because a stronger human-capital motive (for example, a 
referee is strongly heading for a career as a referee) is likely to result eventually in a 
higher league level. 
 14 
4.3 Testing the Public-Goods Model 
According to the public-goods model, there should be a close substitutability between 
one’s own and others’ referee services. Hence, those football referees who answered to 
the public-goods question (“What would you do in case your football club could 
manage to supply the number of referees required by the football association without 
your help?”) in the affirmative should score higher with regard to the indexes of referee 
altruism than referees who negated this question. 
-- Please include Table 6 about here. -- 
Table 6 shows that those football referees who answered in the affirmative have on 
average higher scores with regard to all three indexes (self-attributed motives, other-
attributed motives, adjusted index of self-attributed motives) of referee altruism. A t-test 
of the null hypothesis that the mean index score for those football referees who would 
not continue in case other individuals would become a football referee is not larger than 
the index score for those referees who would continue refereeing in such a case is 
highly significant for all three indexes of referee altruism (self-attributed motives: 
t=8.08; other-attributed motives: t=8.61; adjusted index of self-attributed motives: 
t=8.60; t-tests are significant at the one percent level of significance). 
-- Please include Table 7 about here. -- 
Estimation results (Table 7) for a multivariate logit model confirmed that a higher score 
with regard to the (adjusted) index of self-attributed motives increases the chance that a 
referee answers in the affirmative to the public-goods question, after controlling for the 
influence of a set of reasonable sociodemographic and sports-specific control variables. 
The coefficient of the index is positive for both the self-attributed motives and the 
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adjusted index of self-attributed motives, thus, indicating that the chance of getting an 
affirmative answer to the public-goods question increasing in the index score. In 
contrast, when a referee’s career evolves according to expectations than a he or she is 
less likely to quit in case other individuals start a career as a referee. The predictive 
power of the league level is rather weak. In contrast, the chance of an affirmative 
answer increases in case a referee interrupted his or her career already in the past. An 
active player also is more likely to answer in the affirmative to the public-goods 
question than a referee who has never played football. The number of matches refereed 
per year leads to a lower chance of an affirmative question. While the effect of offences 
and violence are not significant, the frequency of threats increases the chance of quitting 
in case other individuals should decide to become a football referee. 
As a further check, we performed a 2-means clustering analysis. We then computed the 
mean values of the indexes of referee altruism for the two classes (Table 8). The mean 
value of the index of self-attributed motives is substantially higher in the class to which 
the vast majority of those referees belong who gave an affirmative answer to the public-
goods question (though, of course, this class also contains many referees who negated 
this question). The difference in index means is smaller for the index of other-attributed 
motives than for the index of self-attributed motives. 
- Please include Table 8 about here. -- 
Given the positive association between age and the indexes of referee altruism (Section 
3.2) it comes as no surprise that those referees who answer to the public-goods question 
in the affirmative are on average older than those referees who negate this question (t = 
-4.89, p-value < 0.01) 
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4. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This research has contributed to the growing literature on refereeing in sports. The 
specific aspect that this research has focused on concerns the motives of individuals to 
become a football referee. We have organized our research by drawing on the literature 
on the economics of volunteering. In this literature, three broad classes of models have 
been studied: the public-goods model, the private-consumption model, and the human-
capital model. In order to analyze whether the motives of football referees are more in 
line with the public-goods model or its competitors, we have constructed indexes of 
referee altruism. Upon comparing the indexes of referee altruism computed from data 
on self-attributed and other attributed motives, we have found evidence of a self-interest 
bias rather than a social-desirability bias. Moreover, the indexes of referee altruism have 
shown that the private-consumption and the human-capital motive reported by the 
majority of football referees are on average stronger than the reported public-goods 
motives. We also have found, however, that the indexes of referee altruism show a 
relatively large dispersion across referees. We then have used a regression model to 
shed light on the sources of the cross-sectional dispersion of the indexes. Our results 
have shown that the extent of altruism depends in a positive nonlinear way on a 
referee’s age, consistent with human-capital models of volunteering. League level 
exhibits a negative correlation with referee altruism. Finally, based on a specific public-
goods question that captures the substitutability of volunteer activities predicted by the 
public-goods model, we have found evidence supporting the public-goods model. 
In future research, it is interesting to study whether the motives of referees in other 
sports are similar to the motives of German football. It is also interesting to carry out a 
comparative study of the social-desirability / self-interest bias by confronting the 
motives we have reported for football referees with motives of volunteers in other 
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volunteer organizations. Finally, it is interesting to go beyond our analysis in future 
research by comparing our data on members of football clubs who act as a football 
referee with data on members of football clubs who, for whatever reasons, do not 
referee league games. Such a comparison would highlight in which respect football 
referees differ from other club members. 
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Table 1: Motive dimensions 
 
Panel A: Items and Models 
 
I became a football referee because... Model 
I wanted to do something for football after my active career as a 
football player  
PGM 
representatives of my football club asked me 
PGM 
friends of mine asked me 
PGM 
because if I had not become a referee my football club would have 
had to pay a penalty 
PGM 
nobody else wanted to do the job 
PGM 
I wanted to help my local football club 
PGM 
because I was heading for a career as a football referee 
PCM/HCM 
because prospects for a careers as a referee were much better 
than the prospects for a career as a football player  
PCM/HCM 
I was interested in refereeing 
PCM/HCM 
I wanted to earn some money for refereeing football matches 
PCM/HCM 
 
Note: PGM: Public-goods model. PCM/HCM: Private-consumption/human-capital model. 
 
 
to be continued 
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Panel B: Summary Statistics of Items 
 
Motive Self-attributed motives  Other-attributed motives  
 dimension N Mean SD N Mean SD 
interested in 
refereeing 
4,358 4.5 0.80 4,181 3.97 0.83 
help local football 
club 
4,243 3.21 1.44 4,151 3.6 0.98 
heading for a career 
as a football referee 
4,118 3.08 1.41 4,145 3.54 1.00 
do something for 
football after active 
career 
4,293 2.96 1.68 4,172 3.55 1.00 
better prospects for 
a careers 
4,111 2.88 1.52 4,116 3.53 1.02 
earn some money 4,123 2.76 1.34 4,151 3.63 1.02 
representatives of 
football club asked 
4,198 2.33 1.54 4,216 3.62 1.01 
friends asked 4,063 1.99 1.39 3,943 2.74 1.13 
football club would 
have had to pay a 
penalty 
4,106 1.82 1.34 4,116 3.29 1.24 
nobody else wanted 
to do the job 
4,072 1.76 1.25 4,029 2.88 1.26 
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Table 2: Indexes of referee altruism and voluntarism 
 
Statistic 
Index of self-attributed 
motives 
Adjusted index of self-
attributed motives 
Mean value of those who 
seem themselves not as a 
volunteer 
0.69 0.75 
Mean value of those who 
seem themselves as a 
volunteer 
0.80 0.84 
t-test (two sided) -6.35 -8.91 
p-value <0.01 <0.01 
Confidence interval -0.15; -0.08 -0.12; -0.08 
Note: < 0.01 denotes that a p-value is smaller than 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: League level at the time the study was conducted 
 
League level Observations 
1. District level League (Kreisniveau)  2,384 
2. County Level League (Bezirksniveau) 1,167 
3. Referee Pool Conference National League (Landesniveau) 771 
4. Referee Pool Football League 2 (überregionale Liste) 144 
5. Referee Pool Football League 1 (DFB-Liste) 116 
6. FIFA-Referee Pool (FIFA-Liste) 11 
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Table 4: Referees’ experiences with offences, threats, and violence 
 
Panel A: Offences and threats 
 
Category Offences Threats 
Not at all 243 2,009 
Hardly ever 1,166 1,467 
Sometimes 1,957 968 
Often 1,044 182 
Very often 253 39 
 
Panel B: Violence 
 
Category Violence 
Never 3,751 
On one occassion 774 
On several occassions 140 
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Table 5: Socioeconomic correlates of referee altruism 
 
Panel A: The Dependent variable is the index of self-attributed motives. 
 
Regressor Coefficient SE p-value 
Intercept -1.25 0.06 <0.01 
Gender 0.09 0.04 0.03 
Age 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 
Age squared >-0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Income    
<1000€ Baseline   
[1000€; 2,250€) -0.03 0.02 0.23 
[2,250€; 3,500€) -0.05 0.03 0.06 
[3,500€; 4,500€) -0.087 0.03 0.01 
[4,500€; 5,500€) -0.07 0.04 0.08 
>=5,500€ -0.12 0.04 <0.01 
R2 0.22 Degrees of freedom 3,259 
F-test (8; 3,259) 118.4  <0.01 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is the adjusted index of self-attributed motives. 
 
Regressor Estimate SE p-value 
Intercept -0.85 0.04 <0.01 
Gender 0.02 0.03 0.41 
Age 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 
Age squared >-0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Income    
<1000€ Baseline   
[1000€; 2,250€) -0.01 0.02 0.39 
[2,250€; 3,500€) -0.03 0.02 0.07 
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[3,500€; 4,500€) -0.04 0.02 0.03 
[4,500€; 5,500€) -0.05 0.03 0.05 
>=5,500€ -0.08 0.02 <0.01 
R2 0.24 Degrees of freedom 2,960 
F-test (8; 2,960) 120.3  <0.01 
Note: < 0.01 (>-0.01) denotes that an estimated coefficient is smaller (in absolute value) than 0.01 
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Table 6: Indexes of referee altruism and the public-goods question 
 
Statistic Would continue 
refereeing 
Would not continue 
refereeing 
N 3,673 116 
Index of self-attributed motives 
Mean 0.76 1.29 
SD 0.45 0.70 
Index of other-attributed motives 
Mean 0.92 1.09 
SD 0.29 0.34 
Adjusted index of self-attributed motives 
Mean 0.81 1.10 
SD 0.28 0.33 
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Table 7: Estimation results for the logit model 
 
TheDependent variable is the answer to the public-goods question. 
Regressor Coefficient SE p-value Coefficient SE p-value 
Intercept -3.71 0.90 0.00 -4.55 0.97 0.00 
Index 1.22 0.16 0.00 2.14 0.33 0.00 
Expectations       
not all all 
satisfied baseline   baseline   
not really 
satisfied 0.49 0.66 0.46 0.33 0.69 0.63 
in part 
satisfied -0.69 0.60 0.25 -0.60 0.63 0.34 
mostly 
satisfied -1.43 0.59 0.02 -1.42 0.62 0.02 
fully satisfied -1.84 0.64 0.00 -1.71 0.67 0.01 
Gender 0.38 0.56 0.49 0.48 0.57 0.40 
League level       
1 baseline   baseline   
2 -0.66 0.34 0.05 -0.64 0.36 0.07 
3 -0.54 0.47 0.25 -0.50 0.47 0.29 
4 -0.58 1.07 0.59 -0.56 1.08 0.60 
5 -14.04 672.80 0.98 -13.96 691.70 0.98 
6 -14.13 1978.00 0.99 -13.93 2099.00 0.99 
Interrupted 0.61 0.24 0.01 0.51 0.25 0.04 
Active player 0.71 0.22 0.00 0.71 0.23 0.00 
Matches per 
year -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
Training effort 0.02 0.03 0.63 0.01 0.03 0.74 
Offended       
Never baseline   baseline   
Hardly -0.18 0.59 0.76 -0.20 0.60 0.74 
Sometimes -0.27 0.59 0.65 -0.29 0.59 0.62 
Often -0.20 0.62 0.75 -0.16 0.63 0.80 
Very often -1.31 1.02 0.20 -1.34 1.04 0.20 
Threatened       
Never baseline   baseline   
Hardly 0.58 0.30 0.05 0.41 0.32 0.19 
Sometimes 0.67 0.36 0.06 0.61 0.37 0.10 
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Often 1.53 0.69 0.03 1.56 0.71 0.03 
Very often 2.90 1.13 0.01 2.45 1.19 0.04 
Victim of 
violence       
Never baseline   baseline   
One time -0.62 0.42 0.14 -0.73 0.44 0.10 
Several times 0.07 0.64 0.91 -0.22 0.75 0.76 
Degrees of 
freedom 3,151   2,850   
McFadden R2 0.54   0.58   
Note: For league level, see Table 3. 
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Table 8: Results of the cluster analysis (N= 2,523) 
 
Mean value of index Class 1 = Negates Class 2 = 
Affirmative 
answer 
Index of self-attributed motives 
0.67 0.79 
Index of other-attributed motives 
0.90 0.92 
Adjusted index of self-attributed 
motives 
0.77 0.84 
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Figure 1: Histograms of motive indexes 
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Figure2: Indexes of referee altruism by income groups 
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Figure 3: Indexes of referee altruism by age 
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Note: Smooth lines in the lower panels are local quadratic polynomial regressions. 
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Figure 4: Indexes of referee altruism by league level 
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